Go Go XSS Gadgets: Chaining a DOM Clobbering Exploit in the Wild

A few years ago, I discovered a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) chain that incorporated several interesting methods that I usually see in write-ups or Capture the Flag challenges. I had to heavily redact this blog post to ensure the anonymity of the company because it is a bug bounty program with a no disclosure policy. In this post you will see the story of the initial discovery, roadblocks, and finding ways to continue increasing impact to achieve our goal.

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A Tale of Exploitation in Spreadsheet File Conversions


Researchers:


Statement from Slack

Slack would like to thank the researchers for their work to increase the security of the open source tool LibreOffice and their responsible disclosure to Slack. The security of file sharing is critically important to Slack and its users, and we worked with the research team to quickly implement a fix within 24 hours of receiving the report. Slack has confirmed that no customer data was accessed using this bug.


Intro

In our attempt to fingerprint LibreOffice as a PDF rendering service, we identified multiple implementation vulnerabilities.

This writeup covers our efforts to fingerprint LibreOffice, LibreOffice file detection (and abuse) & misuse of the LibreOffice Python-UNO bridge.

The unintended misuse of the Python-UNO bridge by the popular package unoconv resulted in CVE-2019-17400.

We believe our research here is not final, and encourage others to look into this area.

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Yahoo Login Protection Seal – Stored CSS Injection

In 2014 I discovered a vulnerability on Yahoo's Login Protection seal that allowed for CSS injection. This information was saved to the browser and IP, persisting across login sessions on that computer. The protection seal feature has since been removed from the login page, but the feature still exists in your account preferences.

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Google.com – Mobile Feedback URL Redirect Regex/Validation Flaw

Back in October of last year I discovered a JavaScript flaw on Google.com that bypassed protocol validation by abusing an if check against a URL parsed by regex. I was unable to find a way to attack this vector, but was still rewarded a bounty of $500 due to Google knowing of an active browser vulnerability that allowed them to exploit it successfully.

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